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The Rise of Institutional Law Practice
Thomas D. Morgan1
For generations, the legal profession has assumed that only individual
lawyers practice law. Ethical standards have been largely, if not exclusively,
directed at individuals, and practice organizations have been regulated to prevent
limiting individual lawyer professional judgment. The world in which lawyers
now practice makes the individualized model obsolete. The complexity of modern
law narrows the breadth of any individual lawyer=s practice and makes law firms
and other practice organizations inevitable. Firms, in turn, must maintain both
ethical compliance and a high level of service quality that is inconsistent with
lawyers behaving idiosyncratically. The article explores these developments and
suggests changes in the rules governing lawyer conduct needed to respond to the
possibilities and problems the developments create.
I.

The View That Law is Practiced Only by Individuals
For over eight hundred years,2 the term Alawyer@ was a description of a person=s status in

the world. Initially, lawyers were literally Aofficers of the court@ who accompanied the king and
later the royal judges from town to town to resolve disputes. Ultimately, lawyer roles became
more diverse and more focused on representation of private interests, but in all cases, a person
was trained and admitted to lawyer status by more senior members of the legal profession. A set
of activities were then defined as the Apractice of law@ and reserved to those who had a license to
practice. In effect, the legal profession became a secular, self-perpetuating priesthood to which
1
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The usual date for the origin of the legal profession is the late 12th century, during the reign in England of
Henry II. For an introduction to the development of the modern profession over the centuries, see, e.g., PAUL
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people had to turn at important times in their lives.
Traditionally, lawyer-client relationships were seen as personal B between one lawyer
and his or her client. Until the middle of the 20th century, a majority of American lawyers were
solo practitioners and some remain so today.3 And while American lawyers have never been
prohibited from forming firms, throughout most of the country=s history, firms tended to be
small. As recently as 1960, fewer than 40 U.S. law firms had more than 50 lawyers each,4 and
even in 1968, only 20 firms had more than 100 lawyers.5
But then too, even Alarge@ firms were understood to be aggregations of individual
lawyers, not free-standing organizational entities. Indeed, lawyers have strenuously resisted the
idea that institutions B for example, corporations, banks or insurance companies may provide
legal services. In-house legal departments may handle a company's own legal matters, but those
in-house lawyers have not been permitted to represent a business= customers or other third
parties.6 As the Connecticut Supreme Court explained: AThe practice of law is open only to
individuals proved to the satisfaction of the court to possess sufficient general knowledge and
3

See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 298-300 (1989). The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports
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adequate special qualifications as to learning in the law and to be of good moral character. ...
Only a human being can conform to these exacting requirements.@7
That view of law practice as an activity exclusively of individual lawyers largely explains
why the ABA Model Rules continue to regulate the individual lawyers in law firms but not firms
themselves. An American law firm may enter into contracts as an entity and be civilly liable as
an entity for torts committed by firm members in the course of their practice,8 but ordinarily such
a law firm will not itself be subject to professional discipline.9 Instead, the Model Rules impose
personal duties on law firm managers to establish rules designed to help assure that individual
firm lawyers and non-lawyers adhere to the standards of lawyer conduct.10
When asked to let insurance companies use their employed attorneys to represent
policyholders contractually entitled to defense services, the Kentucky Supreme Court refused to
change its rule against such corporate provision of legal services by resorting to the Aage-old
adage of >if it ain=t broke, don=t fix it.=@11 What I am in effect saying in this lecture is that the
system is indeed broken B or at least obsolete B and it is time to fix it.

II.

What Has Changed About the Nature of Lawyer Practice?
7

State Bar Ass=n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 140 A.2d 863, 870 (Conn. 1958).
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ' 9.
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Two important exceptions are New York and New Jersey, which have accepted the idea of imposing
discipline on law firms. N.J. RULES OF PROF=L CONDUCT R. 5.1; N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW, RULES OF PROF=L CONDUCT
R. 5.1, 5.3.
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American Insurance Ass=n v. Kentucky Bar Ass=n, 917 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1996). See also, Gardner v.
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Over the last 40 years, protecting a lawyer=s status as an individual professional seemed
important to lawyers, but I would suggest that to the rest of the American public, the practical
definition of a lawyer=s professional success has become what the lawyer can help a client
accomplish and what trouble the lawyer can help a client avoid. Today, few lawyers any longer
act alone. They act primarily as members of teams, often only some of whose members are
lawyers.
What I am calling the Arise of institutional law practice@ is the multi-person provision of
legal services through organizations ranging from traditional law firms, to corporate legal
departments, to legal aid offices, to prosecutorial and other government agencies, and even to
entities that develop technology designed to simplify client self-representation. In my book, The
Vanishing American Lawyer,12 I explain some of the reasons for this transformation in the way
legal services are delivered and I will summarize the most important here.
First, law has become far more complex over the last 40 years. Even neighborhood
lawyers face issues with multistate and even international dimensions. Clients involved in global
commerce hire or send employees all over the country and the world. Those employees create
family, tax, and other financial issues that were largely unknown to previous lawyer generations.
Even the ablest lawyers cannot be expert in all law everywhere, so the scope of individual
lawyer practice fields has inevitably narrowed. A lawyer who continues to try to be a general
practitioner focusing on local subjects that she studied for the bar exam will neither serve her
clients well nor retain most of her clients long.
Second, the number of people with legal training has exploded over the last 40 years. In
12

THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER (2010).
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1970, America had about 300,000 licensed lawyers. Interest in going to law school B fueled both
by a sense that being a lawyer was a way to make a difference in the world and an increased
interest in lawyering among women and members of minority groups B did not slow until very
recently. Today we have about 1.2 million licensed lawyers, of whom about 1 million are in
practice.13 Given those kinds of numbers, no individual lawyer can rely simply on having a law
license to assure a successful practice. The gap between the number of lawyers trying to practice
available and the number of clients with the means to pay for legal help has widened sharply in
recent years. Basically, the growth in the demand for lawyers tends to track growth in the
nation=s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).14 American law schools increase the number of
available lawyers at a rate exceeding 4% each year, while since 2008 the GDP has increased at
an annual rate of 2% or less.15 It should be no surprise that graduates find it hard to get jobs and
that experienced lawyers must find a field of law in which they stand out as significantly better
than their clients= other choices.
Third, in a world where lawyers must develop a field of expertise in which they can stand
out as unique, a lawyer will do well only so long as his or her expertise is widely needed. If
client needs change, able lawyers in declining fields will face problems. Over 20 years ago,
Professors Gilson and Mnookin suggested that private law firms are organized in significant part

13

THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 81 (2010).
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B. Peter Pashigian, The Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of the Demand for and Supply of Lawyers,
20 J. L. & ECON. 53 (1977); Thomas D. Morgan, Economic Reality Facing 21st Century Lawyers, 69 WASH. L. REV.
625 (1994).
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Put another way, the Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts a 13% increase in the demand for lawyers over
the next decade while the nation=s law schools will increase the supply of lawyers by over 40%. U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2010-11 Edition, found at http://data.bls.gov/cgibin/print.pl/oco/ocos053.htm.
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to diversify the economic risk lawyers face at different stages of a business cycle.16 A booming
economy may keep experienced transactional lawyers busy, for example, as clients seek to
expand or go public. Bankruptcy lawyers, on the other hand, get busier when the economy turns
down.17 Forming law firms allows lawyers with varying specialties to support each other
through good times and bad. In good times, transactional lawyers keep the revenue flowing and
to some extent pay the bankruptcy lawyers more than they deserve. Bankruptcy lawyers return
the favor later.18

16

Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry
into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 322-29 (1985). The authors
concluded that objectives such as economies of scale, the ability to support specialists, and the ability to offer a
range of services could be achieved by firms significantly smaller than the firms then seen, much less the large firms
found today. Id. at 317.
One of the principal competing theories about the growth of law firms was MARC GALANTER & THOMAS
PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRMS (1991). The authors argued that
to attract able young lawyers, firms had to offer a credible hope of partnership and that firms grew as they created
new partner positions for the most successful in the promotion Atournament.@ The theory was later modified in Marc
Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1867 (2008).
More recently, scholars have recognized that unbridled growth of large law firms is facing serious
problems. E.g., Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the Future of the
Law Firm in the New Economy, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2011) (reputations of individual firm members more
important than that of firm as a whole); Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749 (2010)
(alternative providers of legal services undercut the pyramid model on which many firms have been based).
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Robert Nelson suggests an alternative way to state the point, i.e., that firms can provide a base of general
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Anyone who has followed the decline in loyalty to firms and the seemingly endless moves some lawyers
make from firm to firm can see both the reality of the risk-sharing explanation of law firms and the challenges it
presents. This risk sharing model, of course, carries with it certain implications including that the lawyers may try to
(1) avoid working as hard as their partners do but hope to receive a full share of profits anyway (a phenomenon
called Ashirking@), (2) accept support from their partners in their own low-demand times but sell themselves to a
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(Agrabbing@). The ethical status of these practices is explored in, e.g., Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their
Partners: The Law and Ethics of Grabbing and Leaving, 67 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1988); Robert W. Hillman, The Law
Firm as Jurassic Park: Comments on Howard v. Babcock, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 533 (1994); Robert W. Hillman,
The Property Wars of Law Firms: Of Client Lists, Trade Secrets and the Fiduciary Duties of Law Partners, 30 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 767 (2003). See also, Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law Firms, Competition Penalties, and the Values of
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Fourth, being in a firm B or a corporate or government legal department or a legal aid
office B allows lawyers to expand and diversify the services they can provide for clients. This is
another side of the risk sharing advantage. Individual lawyers must limit their practice to
sufficiently few substantive areas that they can stay fully informed in each. Groups of
professionals with multiple areas of interest can provide clients with a greater range of legal
services, sometimes called Aone-stop shopping,@ quite apart from the other advantages that a
diverse range of practices permits a firm to achieve.
Fifth, multi-lawyer organizations can also provide the sheer number of people that some
clients require for the kind of work a client cannot do for itself. A firm can provide the bodies
needed to close a business deal, for example, or try a major lawsuit that would overwhelm a solo
practitioner or even an in-house legal department.19 And when you think about it, this so-called
Aproject@ work can often profitably involve non-lawyers as well as lawyers, a reality that
pervades much of modern law practice.
These realities are as true for organizations serving individual clients as they are for
business lawyers. Many traditional legal services for individuals will tend to be delivered as
commodities, that is, as standardized products sold primarily on the basis of price. Technology,
for example, will allow many documents to be sold as forms or tailored to individual needs using

Professionalism, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1999).
19

George P. Baker & Rachel Parkin, The Changing Structure of the Legal Services Industry and the Careers
of Lawyers, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1635, 1656-59 (2006); Randall S. Thomas, Stewart J. Schwab & Robert G. Hansen,
Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REV. 115 (2001). Providers such as Axiom provide an alternative way to staff large matters;
they provide corporate legal offices with individual lawyers who work on matters, sometimes from home. See
www.axiomlaw.com. In another development, Thomson Reuters has acquired Pangea3, one of the largest
outsourcing firms in India, and has hired U.S. lawyers to do outsourcing work for corporations and law firms. See
Rachel M. Zahorsky, Vendor or Competitor?: Pangea3 Purchase Pleases Some, Worries Others, ABA J., Feb. 2011,
p. 27.
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a few clicks of a computer mouse. If a client needs face-to-face advice for reassurance or needs
to take a matter to court, someone with legal training will become involved,20 but for the kinds of
work that many people with modest training can do quite well, competition will tend to drive
fees to levels far lower than those we see today.
Professor Jerry Van Hoy, who has studied the rise of so-called Afranchise law firms,@
describes lawyers= work there as different than most law schools teach B Amore clerical and salesoriented@ than Aresearching and solving legal problems.@21 On the other hand, even commodity
work is work some clients need done, and people who enjoy developing ways to perform the
work more efficiently for a high volume of clients may thrive in the new environment.22
Increasingly, such work is being performed in a for-profit context as groups like
LegalZoom.com sell millions of dollars worth of clients documents personalized and prepared
based on information entered into the clients= home computers.23 Law schools and other
voluntary organizations might produce checklists, packaged forms, and other guidance that

20

The leading case on writing books is New York County Lawyers= Ass=n v. Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984
(N.Y.App.Div.), rev=d 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967). But see, Matter of Estate of Margow, 390 A.2d 591 (N.J. 1978)
(unlawful for legal secretary to help elderly friend rewrite her will using the old will as a form).
21

See JERRY VAN HOY, FRANCHISE LAW FIRMS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF PERSONAL LEGAL SERVICES

2 (1997).
22

Development of efficient techniques for delivering services will be of particular importance in offices
trying to deliver legal services to the poor. The profitability of efficiency may be an attraction. Managing attorneys
in franchised law practices often share in the fees generated by the office. JERRY VAN HOY, FRANCHISE LAW FIRMS
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF PERSONAL LEGAL SERVICES 29-33 (1997).
23

This work was recently challenged as the unauthorized practice of law, and in Janson v. LegalZoom.com,
Inc., 2011 WL 3320500 (W.D.Mo. 2011), the challenge was upheld based on the fact that nonlawyers were used to
verify a document=s completeness, grammar, and consistency of the personalized information throughout the
document. News reports indicate that the company intends to continue operating in Missouri, albeit with procedures
tailored to meet the court=s objections.
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would allow at least some clients to do their own work.24
III.

How Should the Law Respond to these Developments?
The changes lawyers have faced over the last 40 years are real, and the question becomes

what changes in our thinking about lawyers and lawyer regulation are necessary to deal with the
new reality. We are no longer a self-referential priesthood and others can provide some or all of
the services that our clients need. What rules should apply to lawyers and even nonlawyers now
performing functions that lawyers have traditionally performed and assumed? I believe at least
four changes in lawyer regulation are required to allow lawyers to deliver services effectively
now and in the future.
1. Sanctioning Practice Organizations, Not Just Individual Lawyers
First, while we should continue to require lawyers individually to adhere to standards of
integrity and confidentiality, conduct standards also should be imposed on practice organizations
themselves. This is not a new proposal. Professor Ted Schneyer urged it over 20 years ago,25
and New York and New Jersey have adopted forms of the Schneyer proposal.26 But a large
majority of jurisdictions have yet to move in that direction and the ABA has not seriously
advanced the idea.
Regulating the conduct of practice organizations B not just individual lawyers B continues
to be an idea whose time should come. Firm managers need an incentive to create a world in
which lawyers share responsibility as well as benefits of each other=s conduct. Today, for

24

See, e.g., Julee C. Fischer, Policing the Self-Help Legal Market: Consumer Protection or Protection of the
Legal Cartel, 34 IND. L. REV. 121 (2000). Translation of the documents into languages spoken by the clients will
also facilitate these developments.
25

Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L.REV. 1 (1991).
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example, lawyers are sometimes paid on a basis that they Aeat what they kill,@ i.e., they are paid
based on client matters they attract to the firm. A world of decreased demand for lawyer
services promised to be one in which there will be competition within law firms, not just among
them. In an eat what you kill system, a lawyer knows he will be paid for fee-generating work he
brings in but others will share the liability if the client turns out to be dishonest.27
The risk to firms who see themselves as only aggregations of their members thus can be
enormous. Clients as well as lawyers have a stake in having professional standards that reinforce
efforts of law firms to establish a culture of ethical conduct by each of its lawyers and nonlawyers. Young lawyers learn quickly that their future in the firm depends on how well they
please their elders.28 Everyone has a stake in having firms preserve the value of the reputation
that is a firm-wide asset, and the challenge for managers will be to preserve that asset as firms
develop a less cohesive feel.
Two examples may help provide some reality to the idea of sanctioning organizations,
not simply individuals. First, when LegalZoom was charged with unauthorized practice, it was
the corporation that was charged, not Robert Shapiro or other individual lawyers and nonlawyers who work there.29 Because it is a corporation, we have no trouble seeing LegalZoom as
an entity subject to such a charge, and what I am advocating here is that we see law firms as
26

N.J. RULES OF PROF=L CONDUCT R. 5.1; N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW, RULES OF PROF=L CONDUCT R. 5.1, 5.3.

27

A similar problem arises when one lawyer wants the firm to undertake a representation that would create a
conflict of interest with another client attracted to the firm by a different lawyer. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Ted
Schneyer, Regulatory Controls on Large Law Firms: A Comparative Perspective, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 593, 602-06
(2002).
28

For a rich account of this phenomenon, see Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle
of Pragmatism, 35 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 631 (2005).
29

Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 2011 WL 3320500 (W.D.Mo. 2011).

10

entities in the same way.
Take another example: In Maples v. Thomas, recently decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court,30 two Sullivan & Cromwell associates worked pro bono on a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of an Alabama prisoner sentenced to death. While the matter was awaiting
decision in the district court, each of the lawyers left the firm for other jobs. Neither withdrew as
counsel for the prisoner. The district court denied the habeas petition and the court clerk sent
notice of the denial to the lawyers at Sullivan & Cromwell, their old address. Someone in the
firm=s mailroom noted on the envelope that the lawyers no longer worked there and returned the
notice to the court unopened.
The time for appeal expired, and the question before the Supreme Court was whether the
11th Circuit could hear the appeal anyway. The Court held that it could, because the lawyers had
in effect abandoned their client without his knowledge. But for our purposes, what is important
is that during oral argument, Justice Scalia asked:
AIf we find that these lawyers did abandon their client, will there be some sanction
imposed on them by the bar. I often wonder * * * does anything happen to counsel who
have been inadequate in a capital case? * * * Have you ever heard of anything happening
to them: Other than they=re getting another capital case?@31
It is possible, of course, that the lawyers would be subject to discipline under Rules 1.1
(competence), 1.3 (diligence), and 1.4 (communication), for abandoning their client in this
way,32 but my argument is that Sullivan & Cromwell also should be held responsible. The
delivery of legal services includes the work of people in the mailroom, not just the firm=s
30

Maples v. Thomas, 2012 WL 125438 (Jan. 18, 2012).

31

Official transcript of oral argument in Maples v. Thomas, U.S. Supreme Court, Oct. 4, 2011, at 55.

32

See, e.g., In re Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94 (Ariz. 1993).
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lawyers. Lawyers at law firms come and go, and firm clients should not be the victims of those
departures. The firm itself should bear responsibility for seeing that its obligations to firm
clients are met.33
Interestingly, part of the difficulty this proposal has had getting traction may be that not
everyone applauds the rise of the institutional practice of law. During the same period that law
firms have grown larger, corporate clients have grown as well and some have come crashing
down after instances of outright fraud. Some critics seem to have been tempted to conflate the
growth of corporate law firms with these financial irregularities.34 In part, they suggest that
lawyers in large organizations might be tempted to let a corporate model of Amanaging@ risk
replace the sense of individual responsibility and character that lawyers have been required to
cultivate in the past.35
Examples of corporate and law firm excess are unanswerable,36 but the general case for
linking corporate fraud to institutional law practice seems weak. Every time there is a financial
scandal or a financial crisis, one can make the argument that lawyers should have been able to

33

A natural question that follows, of course, is what the sanction could or should be. It is easy to disbar or
suspend the license of a natural person; it is harder to imagine suspending a law firm. It is not hard to think about
censuring a firm, however, and in today=s competitive environment, even making a firm ineligible to take more pro
bono cases could be a sanction firms would seek to avoid. In any event, because Maples was a criminal case, the
usual malpractice remedy against a firm would be hard to pursue. A majority of jurisdictions require a criminal
defendant pursuing a malpractice remedy to prove affirmatively that he is innocent of the charges against him.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ' 53.
34

Milton C. Regan, Jr., Corporate Norms and Contemporary Law Firm Practice, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
931 (2002); William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for Collective
Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2005).
35

Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management, 94 GEO. L.J. 1909 (2006);
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957 (2006); William H. Simon, The Ethics Teacher=s Bittersweet
Revenge: Virtue and Risk Management, 94 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2006).
36

See, e.g, Milton C. Regan, Jr., Taxes and Death: The Rise and Demise of an American Law Firm, 52
STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS & SOCIETY: LAW FIRMS, LEGAL CULTURE, AND LAW PRACTICE 107 (Austin Sarat, ed.,
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prevent it. Lawyers must have gotten too close to their clients, we hear; lawyers have higher
moral standards than people in finance or other business fields and should be expected to prevent
misconduct. I expect most of us doubt that lawyers are morally superior, however, and in my
view the financial scandals that occurred happened in spite of the failure fully to acknowledge
the institutional practice of law, not because of it.
Rather than the rise of risk management representing a decline in lawyer standards, in my
view risk management is one of the accomplishments of the modern legal profession. Far from
trying simply to Amanage@ risk, risk management has been an effort to establish Ainstitutional
(i.e., firm or practice-wide) policies, procedures, or systems * * * designed to minimize risk
within the firm and its practice.@37 As a result of organizations such as the Attorneys Liability
Assurance Society (ALAS), other legal malpractice insurers, and the personal leadership of
people such as Robert O=Malley, Anthony Davis, and Robert Creamer, firms have reexamined
leadership structures, initiated new matter review procedures, and designated Ageneral counsel@
to receive confidential reports and questions from lawyers concerned about what they are being
asked to do on behalf of a client. In spite of good risk management programs, some lawyers do
and will behave badly, but because of risk management efforts, we can expect the number of
such incidents to be reduced.38
Thus I remain convinced that legal services today and tomorrow will tend to be delivered
2010).
37

Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management: Complementary Visions of Lawyer Regulation, 21
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 99 (2008) (quoting ANTHONY E. DAVIS & PETER R. JARVIS, RISK MANAGEMENT:
SURVIVAL TOOLS FOR LAW FIRMS 4 (2d ed. 2007)). See also, Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as
Regulators of Law Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209 (1996).
38

I think the examples in Anthony V. Alfieri, Big Law and Risk Management: Case Studies of Litigation,
Deals, and Diversity, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 991 (2011), provide some support for this thesis.
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by institutions, not primarily individual lawyers. I think we need to embrace the move toward
institutional practice, not decry it.39 We should retain Model Rule 5.2(a) that makes clear that,
whatever the ethical responsibility of the firm, each lawyer retains a personal responsibility to
conform to the rules of professional conduct,40 but firms themselves should be subject to
professional sanction as well.
2. Acknowledging the Role of Non-Lawyers in Delivering Legal Services
A second change in regulation should acknowledge the appropriate role of non-lawyers
in delivering many kinds of legal services.41 It is hard to deny that non-lawyers already do many
kinds of work traditionally and simultaneously done by lawyers.42 Non-lawyers prepare tax

39

Another objection might be that whenever lawyers try to regulate themselves they will tend to do so in a
way that is ineffective and self-serving. See, e.g., Gillian Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing
Economic Cost of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008). This concern
is also implicit in Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection: How AProfessional Self-Regulation@ Should Promote
Compliance With Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 577 (2011). Professor Schneyer
argues that requirements of institutional Aethical infrastructure@ imposed in the new British and Australian regulatory
systems may do more to promote good firm behavior than will fear of punishment after the fact.
40

MODEL RULES OF PROF=L CONDUCT R. 5.2(a).

41

We tend to think of unauthorized practice rules as applying only to imposters who pretend to do
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returns, for example.43 They also legally give tax advice, or negotiate and argue cases before the
Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court. Similarly, non-lawyer patent agents prepare patent
applications and otherwise advocate on behalf of inventors before the U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office. In each case, the non-lawyers are subject to federal regulation of that practice that
applies to lawyers and non-lawyers alike.44
Further, the ABA Model Rules already acknowledge that law firms may provide services
not traditionally considered legal services. The critical distinction made in current regulations,
however, is that it is lawful for lawyers to employ nonlawyers but not to become their partner if
any of the services would traditionally be viewed as practicing law. That issue of what work
may be delegated to nonlawyers also raises all sorts of practical problems,45 but it is surely a
distinction without a difference unless one presumes that lawyers are better people and always
deserve to be in control. It is not lawyer bashing to say that no such presumption is appropriate.
Traditional limits on the practice of law should be acknowledged as a vestige of a simpler
past. Trial lawyers should continue to register with out-of-state courts before whom they
practice and be admitted pro hac vice, but transactional lawyers should not be expected to do
anything comparable. If a lawyer=s Dallas client is working on a contract in Phoenix, the lawyer
should be able to fly to Arizona. This may seem obvious; it is what lawyers do all the time.
However, charges of unauthorized practice are not unprecedented.46 My point is that the
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fundamental concept of state and even nation-based admission to practice needs to be
reexamined in light of what present and future client needs are found to be.
Several law firms already have expanded their range of services by adding law related
services ranging from economic consulting to private investigation to financial management.
Sometimes the services have been provided from within the firm; at other times, separate standalone or side-by-side entities have been created.47 A friend of mine who does estate planning in
Virginia has transformed himself and his firm into a wealth planning enterprise and he gives
investment advice in addition to drafting wills and trusts. Lawyers in the firm have become
licensed securities dealers and certified financial planners as well as lawyers in order to be able
to deliver this total package. I would not be surprised to see other lawyers and firms take similar
steps in their own areas of expertise, and the question that remains is why they should not be
permitted to partner with investment advisers and securities dealers rather than getting those
licenses themselves.
A decade ago, the report of the A.B.A.=s Multidisciplinary Practice Commission called
for revisions in Rule 5.4, but they were defeated.48 The time has come to revisit the rejection of

Court (ESQ Business Services, Inc.), 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998), in which the California Supreme Court held that a New
York law firm could not collect a fee for representing its client in an arbitration that took place in California.
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licensed to practice. That idea has now found its way into MODEL RULES OF PROF=L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(4) (lawyer
may temporarily deliver legal services where the lawyer is unlicensed if the services Aarise out of or are reasonably
related to the lawyer=s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice@).
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(1993).
48

The proposal was in COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASS=N, REPORT
(1999). There have been several fine analyses of the issues presented, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary
Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the

16

multidisciplinary practice. Multi-service practice organizations are not of interest only to
corporate clients. Social service agencies that want to provide legal services as part of a package
of services to the poor also have a stake in changing the present rules, and in Great Britain, such
smaller entities focused on individual needs have been among the primary applicants for multidisciplinary practice status.49
The Ethics 20/20 Commission has released for comment a possible tentative step toward
recognizing the role of nonlawyers in many kinds of representation. The District of Columbia
has allowed non-lawyer partners in DC firms for many years,50 and under the tentative Ethics
20/20 proposal, lawyers would be permitted to create similar firms called AALPS@ (Alternative
Legal Practice Structures).51 Nonlawyers could be members of such a firm but only if they
provide Aservices that assist the firm in providing legal services to clients.@ The nonlawyer
percentage of ownership would be limited,52 however, and the nonlawyers would be required to
pass a Afit to own@ test.53
While I realize that the 20/20 Commission faces a challenge in getting the ABA House of
Delegates to modify the existing prohibition in any way, limiting such organizations is ultimately
self-defeating. Although U.S. lawyers are now barred from participating in multi-disciplinary
Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115 (2000).
49
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Australian Regulator, 2009 J. PROF=L LAWYER 45, 58-63.
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firms that deliver legal services in the United States, American clients can often get the services
from firms operating out of Great Britain or Australia which have each adopted programs
permitting B but registering and regulating B what the British call Aalternative business
structures@ and the Australians call Aincorporated legal practices.@54 Up to now, the American
Bar Association has acted as though lawyers still operate in a world in which communication
and travel are difficult. Clients know better. Regulatory regimes should properly continue to
require competent service, protection of privileged information and avoiding conflicts of interest.
Blanket prohibition of multi-disciplinary firms, however, should no longer be the rule.
3.

Permitting Restrictive Covenants

Third, Model Rule 5.6(a) should be amended to permit restrictive covenants designed to
impose reasonable restrictions on a lawyer=s changing firms. In the name of not restricting
lawyer mobility, Rule 5.6 now prohibits many kinds of financial penalties that firms seek to use
to discourage moving to another practice setting.
The traditional argument against such restrictions has been that they violate a lawyer=s
professional independence and a client=s freedom to choose its own lawyer.55 That probably
made sense in a world in which most lawyers practiced alone anyway. Today, however,
relatively few lawyers are independent; most work within some kind of firm or other
organization and the financial viability of such firms and organizations depends on a reasonably
stable number of contributing partners.
54
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In the name of not restricting lawyer mobility, Model Rule 5.6 now permits a lawyer to
leave her current firm with little or no notice, while at the same time trying to persuade clients to
follow the lawyer to a new firm. The Rule likewise prohibits most kinds of financial penalties
that firms might try to use to discourage such departures.56
One need not argue that lawyers must be yoked to the same firm forever to recognize that
reasonable restrictions on departure can allow firms more financial security and flexibility in
establishing their partnership rules and compensation structures. Important as mobility is, firms
must contract for space, hire associates, and develop a reputation that only a degree of
institutional stability permits.57 It can cost law firms competing for top talent anywhere from
$200,000 to $500,000 to bring a recent law graduate into the firm as an associate.58 Nevertheless,
at many firms, at least 40% of new hires have voluntarily resigned by the end of their 3rd year in
practice, hardly having made back the cost the firm spent to recruit them. The law will not
enforce restrictive covenants in any field that are excessive in scope or duration, but there seems
no good reason to subject lawyer covenants to greater restriction.
Ultimately, firms are likely to have to convince young lawyers that they have a future at
the firm that will be attractive over a multi-year career. Doing so is likely to improve a firm=s
bottom line. In some cases, the solution may be part time work. In other cases, associates need
to be given a sense they are growing in their practice, but requiring lawyers to spend a given
period at a firm after joining it could be an important part of the process. Some courts have
56
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implicitly acknowledged this, recognizing that persons who make up a law firm should be
capable of reaching arrangements appropriate to their situation.59 Conforming the rules to the
decisions would be a third step in helping firms deal with the oncoming realities they will face.
4.

Changes in the Means of Financing Law Practice

Under current rules, lawyers who practice together in a firm may allocate firm revenues
among themselves according to a partnership agreement or other contract. In a small firm, the
senior partner who founded the firm might get 50% of all profits, for example, while in other
firms the revenues might be divided according to a formula that acknowledges who attracted
each case as well as who worked on them. Firms typically cover their fixed costs by payments
from each partner or shareholder at the time they join the firm; those sums are then returned
when the partner leaves the firm.
What firms may not do today is allow non-lawyers to invest in the law firm. All
American jurisdictions have some form of ABA Model Rule 5.4(d) that says:
A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or
association authorized to practice law for a profit, if (1) a nonlawyer owns any interest
therein . . .; (2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies the
position of similar responsibility . . .; or (3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control
the professional judgment of a lawyer.
This prohibition both denies law firms the ability to raise a potentially important form of
capital and reduces the incentive a firm can give its members to help build the firm as an
effective, ethical institution that would be attractive to outside investors. Further, if one accepts
the idea that firms should be able to deliver more than legal services and the idea that restrictive
covenants are not anathema, the sale of stock in a law firm is but a short step. Non-lawyer
59
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participation in firm operation and management will itself involve recognition of the propriety of
non-lawyers investing time and sharing the benefits of a firm=s potential success.60
It is not self evident that lawyers will want to take in outside investors. Lawyers who can
afford to self finance will not want to share earnings with outsiders who will demand a premium
for uncertainty. But many law firms generate significant streams of income, and allowing
lawyers to sell their firms to outside investment would permit existing lawyers to realize
something of the economic value they have created. They can now do that only by a sale to their
remaining partners, or sale to other lawyers. A desire to attract and retain outside investors may
also tend to impose financial discipline on law firms whose members have perhaps heretofore
not had a significant incentive or experienced serious pressure to exercise it.
Any capital required to help a law firm build out office space, buy furniture and new
technology, stock the library, guarantee a lease, or otherwise provide working funds traditionally
has been borrowed from the partners or from banks. Given a history of law firm finance that has
seemed to work for generations, a natural question might be why law firms would want to raise
equity capital from third parties at all. Ordinarily, one only seeks outside capital at all when the
projected return is likely to exceed the cost, and in a world of low interest rates, borrowed money
has long looked like the way to keep law firm profits in the hands of the lawyer-partners.
But there are at least three reasons why law firm interest in selling equity seems to be
growing. First, law firms have long paid profits out each year rather than retaining earnings.
The result is to make money less available or more costly for long-term investment in new
60
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technology, new offices, or to support an expanded scope of practice.
The Australian and U.K. experience tends to confirm this explanation. Slater & Gordon,
for example, reported a need to consolidate several offices into larger ones and a need to finance
high litigation expenses between the time a case is filed and the time the fee becomes payable.61
In the U.K., it seems to be midsize firms that want to expand their ability to use technology to
deliver commodity services to middle class clients that may be especially hungry for capital.
A second reason for a law firm=s turning to non-lawyer investors will be to create a liquid
market in firm shares so that good will can be priced and departing partners can realize full
value for their years of service. Successful managers in other industries receive stock options, the
argument goes. They profit when the company profits and they pay taxes at capital gain rates on
the increase in their share value. Lawyers and law firm managers, on the other hand, basically
receive only a pass-through of fees earned that is taxed at high ordinary-income marginal rates.
A third incentive for seeking non-lawyer investment may be to create a more lasting
institutional character to the modern law firm and to encourage the development of the firm=s
brand identity and its reputation for ethics and quality. A law firm=s principal assetsCits partners
and associatesCwalk out the firm=s door every day, have no obligation to return, and often get no
more or less in return of their capital investment if they have helped the firm prosper or simply
get by.62 In such an environment, even equity partners have little personal stake in the firm as an
institution, other than not to be left holding the bag if the firm fails. When outside investors are
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involved, on the other hand, there are parties with a genuine stake in the institution=s growth and
prosperity. And the incentives flow to the lawyers as well. The best way to get people to devote
full effort to their law practice may be to give them something tangible to show for their efforts
when the time comes to leave.63
But if there are legitimate reasons for seeking outside investors, why have lawyers so
long resisted the idea? The first reason is probably historical. As we saw earlier, until the late
1960s, law firms tended to be quite small. In 1968, for example, only twenty U.S. law firms had
over 100 lawyers. In a small firm, personal relationships provide bonding and incentives for firm
survival that outside investors might do little to augment. Further, few outside investors would
likely have wanted to put their money into such small operations. In short, until recent years,
there was more disinterest than opposition to the subject of outside investment in law firms.
But for those who did think about the issue, one concern was that lawyers are their
clients= agents and have a fiduciary duty to focus principal attention on their clients= interests.
Law firms exist to help lawyers provide that kind of fiduciary attention. Admitting non-lawyer
investors to the mix will create a competing interest in earning a high economic return, the
argument goes, thus potentially compromising the interests of clients or even influencing the
lawyers= professional judgment of how to represent the clients.
A related concern is that shareholders who are not firm lawyers will inevitably expect
information about the firm and its clients, if only to measure management success and to predict
inconsistent with the best concepts of our professional practice.@
63

See, e.g., Charlotte Edmond, Private Equity Firm First to Openly Target Legal Services in U.K.,
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=900005560588 (reporting on the plans of investment house
Lyceum Capital, whose advisory board includes Richard Susskind, IT advisor to the Lord Chief Justice, and Tony
Williams, former director of Andersen Legal, the legal arm of the late-Arthur Andersen accounting firm).

23

future firm performance. Confidential client information is something a lawyer must keep
inviolate. Even a client=s identity is normally not public information and may not be disclosed
other than when doing so would be in the client=s interest. Market information, on the other hand,
is essential and the inherent tension over its release may seem to place insurmountable limits on
sale of equity securities.64
A different concern is that the involvement of non-lawyer investors would reduce
lawyers= willingness to tell clients what the clients don=t want to hear. The last time a serious
effort was made to bring law firms into modernity by opening them up to non-lawyer partners,
the Enron scandal broke in which lawyers were accused of turning a blind eye to wrongdoing by
Enron executives. Critics largely ignored the fact that the Enron events took place under the
current regime, not one involving non-lawyers, but the critics suggested the events might have
turned out even worse if profit-making rather than client service became a law firm=s touchstone.
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Finally, many lawyers seem to have a recurring nightmare of waking up working for
Walmart. One of the early proposals when the ABA Model Rules were proposed in 1983 was that
the barrier against lawyers practicing with non-lawyers be breached. Geoffrey Hazard, reporter to
the ABA Commission was asked: ADoes this mean Sears & Roebuck will be able to offer a law
office?@ When Hazard answered Ayes,@ the proposal was defeated. Lawyers working for
non-lawyers, it seemed, would be demeaning and thus unprofessional.65
The answers to these objections, of course, are not hard to see. First, the idea that only
outside investors have a profit motive ignores the history of large law firms over the last forty
years. Profits have been widely publicized in the American Lawyer and elsewhere.66 They have
been the lure to attract new lawyers, the incentive to work evenings and weekends, and the
measure of many lawyers= self-worth. The presence of outside investors may change how profits
are shared but not whether profits are sought.
Second, there is nothing about doing well as a lawyer that inhibits doing good work for
clients or helping them obey the law. Most clients, most of the time, want help to stay out of
trouble, not figure out how to violate legal standards. Clients sometimes may want to move the
law in directions that outside observers would not favor, but that difference in viewpoint neither
makes their lawyers less civic-minded nor likely has anything to do with whether a firm has
issued equity capital.67
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Third, most of the talk today is about firms seeking private capital from sophisticated
investors rather than selling publicly-traded stock as Slater & Gordon did. While one could
imagine law firms doing the kind of financial reporting that the SEC requires, it would likely be
more trouble than it is worth, and reducing the number of investors actually involved would tend
to reduce the amount of even non-sensitive client information that would be made available.
Finally, lawyers are likely to have to get over the fear of all of their clients turning to
Walmart for their legal needs. Most lawyers do not provide services to Walmart customers or
other middle class clients today. Those potential clients represent a possible growth market for
lawyers, however, and a potential unmet demand. At least the start-up costs to do that kind of
work will require the kind of capital that outside investors can provide, and Walmart and other
mass merchandisers seem as good a source of capital as any.
The more serious practical question is whether anyone who is well-informed would decide
to invest in a law firm. As the economy rebounds, lawyers will do better, but law practice activity
tends to lag economic recovery, not lead it. Stock in a law firm, in short, will tend to track most
other business investments, not hedge or otherwise complement them. But whether non-lawyer
investment in law firms is wise as an investment strategy is largely beside the point. The practice
of allowing non-lawyer investment in law firms has the potential of providing a genuine
economic benefit and a relatively low risk of public harm. If not an idea whose success is
inevitable, it=s an idea whose time has come to be taken seriously.

Conclusion
61, 64-67 (2008). Professor Regan is likely correct that those who oppose outside investment would not be impressed
by the distinction, id. at 67-70, but it is a possible middle ground.
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The point of this article has been to call for a response to changes in the delivery of legal
services that I have called the rise of institutional law practice. I believe the changes are
irreversible and constructive. The logical vehicle for articulating and addressing these changes
would be the ABA Ethics 20/20 Commission, but its response has been disappointingly modest.
Inevitably, institutional law practice is here to stay and the only sensible question is how
to embrace it and make it better serve the public interest. That is the insight Great Britain and
Australia have had in their moves to register and regulate law practice organizations, in addition
to registering and regulating individual lawyers.68 While the new regulatory structure in both
countries was initiated by antitrust authorities rather than the legal profession itself, neither Great
Britain nor Australia lacks a developed sense of lawyer professional duty and practitioners have
largely accepted the new regime. We can learn a lot from their experience, and I believe we
should adapt their insights to the American legal profession at our earliest opportunity. Until we
do so, the ABA is likely to have to consider these issues again and again until it gets them right.
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